

Preventing the Low-Rate Dos Attacks in Web Server Using Router Based Firewall

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Abstract— The Quality of Service is the main feature of Internet services. To fault these services of the web server or a website, the attacker uses a Denial of Service (Dos) attack and these Dos attacks nowadays can be easily detected using many attack detection tools. The Low-rate Denial of service (LRDoS) attacks are a new type of Dos attacks that sends high intensity requests in an ON/OFF pattern to degrade victim's performance and evade the detection designed for traditional DoS attacks. It is more difficult for traditional DoS attack detection method to detect LRDoS attack. The existing system analyze only the impact of LRDoS attack on a affected system and the existing detection method focus only on TCP related system. A live firewall is managed in our proposed system to monitor all the invoking requests and IP address of the attackers. The Particle Swarm Optimization technique is combined with Genetic algorithm and Priority scheduling concept to produce Classification rules. The Router based Firewall use these rules and IP address of the client to filter the LRDoS attack.

Keywords— Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service(DDoS), Low Rate Denial of Service (LRDoS), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Particle Swarm Optimiser (PSO).

I. INTRODUCTION

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks can bring down an Internet service, by flooding the high amount of request to the web server. DoS attacks send out high-volume requests to the victim. An adversary bent on limiting access to a network can bring down an Internet service by subjecting it to sustained levels of demand that far exceed its capacity, making that service incapable of adequately responding to legitimate requests. The Quality of Service is the main feature of Internet services. To fault these services of the web server or a website, the attacker uses a Denial of Service (Dos) attack and these Dos attacks nowadays can be easily detected using many attack detection tools. Although DoS attacks can inflict significant damage, preparing a DoS attack requires some additional work. In particular, it requires recruiting enough zombie clients to launch the attack. These zombie clients are typically compromised computers scattered all over the Internet. Moreover, just by their brute force nature, these attacks are easily exposed, making it possible for appropriate countermeasures to be taken once attacks are detected. LRDoS attacks send out intermittent (instead of continuous) high-volume requests. It forces the victim away from the desired

state, thus deteriorating its performance. Moreover, LRDoS attacks can escape the detection designed for flooding-based DoS attacks because of their ON/OFF traffic patterns. The Low-rate Denial of service (LRDoS) attacks are a new type of Dos attacks that sends high intensity requests in an ON/OFF pattern to degrade victim's performance and evade the detection designed for traditional DoS attacks. It is more difficult for traditional DoS attack detection method to detect LRDoS attack. The existing system analyzes only the impact of LRDoS attack on an affected system and the existing detection method focus only on TCP related system. A live firewall is managed in our proposed system to monitor all the invoking requests and IP address of the attackers. The implementation is done by using Particle Swarm Optimizer (PSO) combined with Genetic algorithm and Priority Scheduling. This produces the Classification rules. The Firewall uses these rules and IP address of the client to filter the LRDoS attack and thus defends the LRDoS attacks.

II. RELATED WORK

DDoS attacks drain bandwidth or system resources to prevent normal users from receiving quality of service. Traditional flood-based attacks can be easily detected because of their continuously high sending rates. In contrast, LRDoS attacks have polymorphic traffic patterns and low average sending rates.

A. Low-Rate DoS Attacks

LRDoS attacks were first proposed to throttle the throughput of TCP connections by causing intermittent packet losses. Zhang and Schuchard showed that an attacker can launch LRDoS attacks on BGP sessions for crippling the Internet's control plane. Recently, researchers examined the vulnerability of other applications to LRDoS attacks, including Internet services, load balancers, wireless networks, and peer-to-peer networks. Guirguis found that an LRDoS attack can force a feedback control system to oscillate between the desired state and another state, and analyzed the effect of such attack on a web server. Guirguis described the possibility of launching the LRDoS attack on a feedback-control based system. We formally show that the LRDoS attack can compel a feedback control system to stay at a state other than the desired state by proving that the system under attack is *Lyapunov* and *Lagrange* stable. A novel methodology is used to systematically evaluate the impact of an LRDoS attack on specific systems. This methodology enables us to obtain many new insights that are not reported before. Guirguis only examined the third type of LRDoS attack. Moreover, we

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thoroughly analyze each type of LRDoS attack, including giving closed-form expressions for the throttled admission rate, determining the conditions under which the LRDoS attack will make the web server Lyapunov and Lagrange stable, deciding the bound of the system's state and the relationship between the bound and the LRDoS attack, and identifying the relationship between the damage caused by an LRDoS attack and its cost.

B. Defending Against LRDoS

As LRDoS attacks have ON/OFF traffic patterns, they can evade detection schemes targeting flooding-based DoS attacks and therefore have motivated the design of new detection approaches. However, these approaches cannot be directly used to detect LRDoS attacks against Internet services for two reasons. First, as all of these approaches aim at LRDoS attacks targeting TCP or other systems (e.g., wireless networks, P2P networks, etc.), they rely on features specific to TCP and those systems. For example, we proposed the detection of anomalies in incoming TCP data traffic and outgoing TCP ACK traffic. Shevtekar regarded a TCP flow as malicious if its period is equal to the fixed minimal RTO and its burst length is no less than other connections' RTTs. To detect LRDoS attacks using spoofed IP addresses, Shevtekar captured anomalies that short-lived flows occupy a high percentage of the total traffic going through a link. We proposed a new metric named the congestion participation rate (CPR) to infer attack flows that try to send more packets during congestion. To detect distributed LRDoS attacks, Xiang used generalized entropy and information distance to quantify anomalies in packets, and required the control of all routers in the network. However, the detection of LRDoS attacks aimed at Internet services requires new metrics. Second, the majority of the previous work focuses on the Shrew attack that has a fixed attack period equal to TCP's minimal RTO. However, LRDoS attacks can change their attack periods for mimicking normal flows. Sun suggested using autocorrelation and dynamic time warping (DTW) to detect Shrew attacks, because their traffic bursts are the same and have fixed periods. However, it is unnecessary for LRDoS attacks to have invariable periods and similar attack pulses.

C. Particle Swarm Optimisation

Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is a computational method that optimizes a problem by iteratively trying to improve a candidate solution with regard to a given measure of quality. PSO optimizes a problem by having a population of candidate solutions, here dubbed particles, and moving these particles around in the search-space according to simple mathematical formulae over the particle's position and velocity. Each particle's movement is influenced by its local best known position but, is also guided toward the best known positions in the search-space, which are updated as better positions are found by other particles. This is expected to move the swarm toward the best solutions. The algorithm was simplified and it was observed to be performing optimization. PSO is a metaheuristic as it makes

few or no assumptions about the problem being optimized and can search very large spaces of candidate solutions. However, metaheuristics such as PSO do not guarantee an optimal solution is ever found. More specifically, PSO does not use the gradient of the problem being optimized, which means PSO does not require that the optimization problem be differentiable as is required by classic optimization methods.

III. SYSTEM REALISATION

A. Existing Approach

The present system focus towards the DOS attack by providing the feedback controller in the mid of the data access. The Prediction of client access and the timing difference between the data access arise from the specific client provides a notable portion of analysis by the server. In this case, the server invokes the proxy site which is considered as the feedback controller which can take care of reducing the rate of DOS attack. The feedback controller will take care of evaluating the robot access or human access followed by reducing the DOS attack by prioritizing the direct request from the client to the website when compared to the request coming in from the feedback controller page. The drawbacks of the present system are: 1) The LRDoS attacks cannot force the system's state error to oscillate along with the attack. 2) The LRDoS attack can be sent out continuously, to drive the system to a state other than the desired state. 3) There is no precautions to block the LRDoS attacks on a feedback control system.

B. Proposed Approach

We present the design and implementation of an automated system that performs specific instruction execution management on LRDoS attacks. A website is managed in our proposed system which involves Monitoring of invoked requests and automating redirection of temporary feedback controlled sites for Low Rate DOS. Restricting the High privilege instruction executable users from further accessing on the server. The implementation provides more priority to the direct access users when compared to the request received through proxy feedback controlled users. LRDoS attack is one of the most vulnerable attack through which users can send attacks in ON/OFF patterns. To overcome the above penetration, our proposed system focuses towards avoidance of multiple feedbacks from a same proxy in a particular piece of time. The LRDoS attacks can force the system's steady-state error to oscillate along with the attack. The existence of a LRDoS attacks can be intermittent, to drive the system to a state other than the desired state. We implement firewall to block the LRDoS attacks on a feedback control system.

The Particle Swarm Optimization technique is combined with Genetic algorithm and Priority scheduling concept to produce Classification rules. This Firewall uses these rules and IP address of the client to filter the LRDoS attack.




Fig 3.1 LRDoS Detection Mechanism

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

A. LRDoS Attacker

The LR-DoS attack tool will first connect to the database of the feedback form and acquire the ip address. Then we will input the url address of the website of the feedback form to input the n number of comments to the feedback database. By providing these false data, the admin and the user will be totally disturbed and various false data may lead to the in quality product and the trust worthiness of the website will be in danger. Thus the user will pose a unworthiness of the website and may degrade the website .By using the LRDoS tool ,the website steady state will be disturbed and random feedback will be entered into the module while the feedback will be sent according to the connection type.

B. Defending the LRDoS Attack

The detection of LRDoS attack is done by managing a live firewall. It monitors the invoked request and IP address of the user. Thus restricting the High privilege instruction from further accessing on the server. This avoids multiple feedbacks from a same proxy in a particular piece of time. This implementation is done by using Particle Swarm Optimiser(PSO) combined with Genetic algorithm and Priority Scheduling. This produces the Classification rules. The Firewall uses these rules and IP address of the client to filter the LRDoS attack and thus defends the LRDoS attacks.

V. CONCLUSION

We investigate the vulnerability of Internet services to the LRDoS attacks. We first examine the impact of the LRDoS attacks on a web server and prove that LRDoS attacks can damage the web server and causes loss of time and data. Our methodology proves as an efficient mechanism to defend the LRDoS attacks on specific servers by managing a live firewall and mitigating its impacts. In future work, the system can be upgraded by enhancing the security provided by the firewalls.

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